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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the connectivity between privatisation and private capital 
accumulation. Many previous studies lzave proved tllat privatisatiorr lras had a 
direct and positive effect on capital ncc~murlation through aftrncting privnte 
investn~errt. Ethiopia, one of the least cleveloped corlrrtries (LDCs), and ltaving 
spent t~vo  decades of conrmunisnr, 11as irnpletrrerzted privatisatiorr programme as 
a tneans of nttractirtg a sizable itzvestmer~t sr~clr as the foreign direct investrrrertt 
(FDI). We rrsed data over tert years, 1994195 to 2003/04, and applied 
correlation and regression analyses to establisl~ the effect of the Ethiopian 
privatisntion programme on capital accumulation. The empirical results show 
that privatisation is robustly negative to capital accumulation. We suggest that 
the corintry needs to improve economic and political stability as well as 
openness coupled ~vitlr revitnlising tlre priwtisntion progranvne to prevent the 
Ethiopian eco~ronry front further capital sabotage. 
Keywords: Privatisation, capital accumulation, FDI, openness, private 
investment 
JEL Classification Number: E22, F15, F21, L33 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the globe, privatisation has become one of the instruments 
of economic reform process. The reason for privatisation has 
deeply been debated since its formal introduction in the 1980s. 
However, a clear observation upon privatisation for the past three 
decades indicates that privatisation is adopted by the world 
economies for some specific reasons only, particularly for 
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economical and political considerations, depending upon their 
perspectives. The manifesto of privatisation differs from one 
economy to another depending on a country's objectives a ~ d  
agenda. Many countries irrespective of their economic status have 
launched privatisation programme with a different mixture of these 
agenda. There are the strong evidences that many developed 
countries have had accelerated privatisation which is equally 
important for economical and political missions (Esser, 1998; 
Aharoni, 1988 and 1991), whereas in the developing countries, 
privatisation stands more for economical and less for political 
reasons, targeting only the economic growth (Donaldson and 
Wagle, 1995) and social uphill. 
Privatisation as a strong reform measure aims at various 
economic missions such as ensuring sustainable development 
through efficient private participation and investment, reduction 'of 
budget deficit and external debt, increase of social overheads, 
whereas as for political missions, it  works at extending and 
widening ownership to public and reducing the government burden 
- preferably a withdrawal from the whole to the part in state 
intervention. Among all these missions, attracting investment 
particularly from the private investors, which is indispensable for 
accomplishing both economic and political missions, is considered 
a golden rule not only to avoid shortage of capital, but also to lead 
an economy towards sustainable economic growth. 
Privatisation, in fact, brings about prj va te investment which 
has become the most important source of finance for developing 
countries. The case was entirely different before the 1980s which 
failed to see and implement privatisation as a tool of 
macroeconomic liberalisation facilitating private investment 
(Sadar, 1995:2). Since then, however, privatisation has grown 
strongly and rapidly in a number of developing countries. This 
development has helped to create an attractive business 
environment, and has intensified the interest of private investors, 
Privatisation, moreover, may explore the covered avenues to the 
extent of benefiting a country including attracting foreign. direct 
investment (FDI)(Economic Perspective, 2001 :3) because many 
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studies have already proved that the relationship between 
privatisation and FDI variables is significant and positive. Sadar 
(1995) proves this through regression analysis over a cross-section 
of 36 countries for the period of 1988 to 1993.. 
There are two strong reasons of how privatisation attracts 
investment: First, privatisation itself can serve as a tool for capital 
flow since private investors spend their sizable wealth for 
purchasing those state owned enterprises (SOEs), and in terms of 
further investment such as capacity expansion, modernisation and 
renovation in what they have purchased. Second, any privatisation 
programme, if well tailored, has already been proved to have a 
positive correlation with direct investment that comes from the 
new domestic and foreign investors. This is because of the reason 
that the privatisation programme itself acts as a media popularising 
a country as an attractive investment location. Cook and Uchida 
(2003) justify that if privatisation were sufficiently extensive and 
had efficiency-inducing effects, it would increase the opportunities 
for investment in newly privatised enterprises by releasing them 
from the capital constraints previously faced under public 
ownership. Moreover, it would reduce crowding out and provide 
more credit to the private sector. 
Thus, privatisation has many connections with investment 
which is sometimes imponderable. The size, speed, processing, 
regulatory framework and market creation are the impetus 
affecting the flow of investment, particularly the speed at which 
privatisation moves is said to have linked positively with 
investment. No one can refute the fact that the greater the speed, 
accuracy and feasibility of the programme, the higher will be the 
investment an economy attracts. But, many African countries have 
failed in this regard, leaving their investment potentiality including 
FDI unused owing to the poor processing and slow rate of 
privatisation (Eden, 1996). 
Not only is investment, but even other benefits of 
privatisation are neither known nor realised particularly in African 
countries, which is mainly due to the attitudes of top level 
politicians and legislators. Miller (1997) questions the credibility 
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of legislators and officers, who obviously impede the privatisation 
activity as they feel too comfortable to stick to state-run 
enterprises. He has also found that the pressure coming from their 
side has preceded some of the privatisation activities across the 
world. Further, the small size and fragmentation of most African 
economies, their structural rigidities, vulnerability to continuing 
political instability, low levels of infrastructure, poorly developed 
financial markets and lack of institutional support and business 
capacity are the major challenges affecting the private sector 
development through privatisation (IFC, 1999). 
Ethiopia, which is no exception to the aforementioned 
scenario - can be considered an economy in transition - finding its 
path full of challenges with a view to improving a better 
investment climate through privatisation. The reason is that there 
has been not more than one and half a decade since the country 
surfaced out of socialism. The Derge - the Marxist military 
government - came in 1974 which ruled the country with more 
centralised and communistic ideals. After the ousting of the Derge 
regime, the country in line with other African countries, 
implemented privatisation in 1994 with a view to solving its major 
economic ailments, such i s  weak operating mechanisms of SOEs, 
economic instability, increasing budget deficits, alarming high 
external debt and steady increase of poverty rate. Nonetheless, the 
programme is devised in such a way that it would generate the 
required revenues through encouraging the private sector's 
expansion which in turn is expected to be guaranteed by a smooth 
flow of investment. Ethiopia, suffering from the low per capita 
income and high rate of poverty, has also understood the obstacle 
of the vitality of the private sector's investment, and has attempted 
to attract a substantial investment through its own privatisation 
paradigm. 
The purpose of this paper is to critically analyse the 
relation between the privatisation and private capital accumulation 
in Ethiopia, using data over the period 1994195' to 2003104. The 
' The Ethiopian fiscal year begins on 8"'July and ends on 7"' July 
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study mainly emphasises the changes and effects on private capital 
accumulation brought by the privatisation programme in the 
country. The paper is organised into five sections. The next section 
outlines the methodology adopted for the study which is followed 
by a subsection on model specifications. Section 3 analyses the 
magnitude of privatisation, and its effect on certain 
macroeconomjc variables through simple correlation analysis as a 
pre-test to the empirical analysis of capital accumulation. Section 4 
discusses the effect of privatjsation on private capital 
accumulation, followed by empirical testing and interpretation. 
The final section provides a summary and ,thus, concludes the 
study. , 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Data was collected from the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MoFED), Gazettes of Government of Ethiopia 
(GoE), Ethiopian Privatisation Agency (EPA) and also from the 
development reports and data bank of the International Financial 
Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The privatisation for this study implies only the 
privatisation of state owned enterprise (SOEs), but not real estates 
and lands2. The study used data over only ten years, 1994195 to 
2003104~, referred to as the privatisation period. It applies 
regression analysis with the help of various functional and policy 
variables that may contribute to the investment potentialities of a 
country. A regression model, explained with more details 
subsequently is developed using the perspectives of the heterodox 
model which does not conclude that the non-significant variables 
Real estates and lands, which were taken over in violation by then Derge 
Regime during 1974 to 1991, have been handed over to their previous owners in 
the wake of the country's political transition. As these transactions were made 
for a nominal restitution fee in return, it lacks a sound eccnomic justification to 
be called as privatisation. 
As the privatisation programme commenced its first transaction in 1994195, the 
period of study is limited only to ten years, lacking a sufficient data of time 
series for regression analysis. 
. 
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necessarily imply that the hypothesised causal links are invalid 
(Weeks, 2001). Correlation is applied, preceding the regression 
analysis, to examine if privatisation has any linear relationship 
with some of the important macroeconomic variables affecting 
capital accumulation. 
Model Specifications 
We have made an attempt to bring empirical evidence of the 
Ethiopian privatisation on private capital accumulation, using the 
heterodox growth model found in Weeks (2001). In principle, I 
(Independent) variables have to be selected with great care (Cook 
and Uchida, 2003:130). In view of this, I variables are chosen for 
every model with ample justifications with a view to drawing a 
reasonable result. Any result obtained from this regression that 
exhibits a significant level of multicollinearity (that is, a regression 
showing that a variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than five) 
is discarded from these results. Moreover, the results are adjusted 
for the presence of autocorrelation. Durbin-Watson is used to 
detect the autocorrelation and also the analysis is ensured that 
homoscedasticity is met. 
The model presented below is constructed with a view to 
including all the basic macro relationships: GDP growth, savings, 
inflation, real interest rate, privatisation and war with Eritrea, a 
dummy variable. Of these six variables, real interest rate and 
privatisation are policy variables. 
In[PK/Y]t = b,+ b,I~z[y],.~ + b2bz[S/Y], + b.711~ [p], 
+ b4In [r],., + b51n [PRIV/Y],+ba Dl + u, 
The response variable, private capital accumulation [PKIY], 
represents only the private investment accumulated over the study 
period. Gross capital accumulation, which is often referred to as a 
proxy for investment (Cook and Uchida, 2003:131), is put off, 
because i t  includes both private and public investment. Moreover, 
in countries like Ethiopia dominated by public investment its 
inclusion may not reveal a correct result. Thus, public investment 
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is subtracted from the gross capital accumulation. In the above 
equation, growth rate of output, lagged one period, [y],~ indicates 
that investment is assumed to respond to changes in output in the 
previous period. The inclusion of growth rate of GDP as an 
independent variable in the regression can be justified from the 
standpoint that the causality runs from growth to investment and 
not vice versa (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). It is further 
assumed that inflation [p] has a negative effect on the private 
sector element of investment, by fostering a short-term preference 
for non-productive investments with a rapid turnover (Weeks, 
2001:58\1. Savings as a share of GDP (SlYh and the tea\ interest 
rate of lagged one period [r],.~, a policy variable that tends to 
influence each other are included as variables which determine not 
only the major portion of investment, but also are strongly 
influenced by the available investment opportunities (Griffin and 
Icknowitz, 2001). Privatisation variable (PRIVIY),, the explanatory 
variable in the model is assumed to have inflated the inflows of 
investment. War with Eritrea (D,,, which broke out in  1998, is 
fitted as a dummy variable (where D=l for the war situation and 0 
otherwise) in order to capture its effect on investment and also its 
inclusion has the assumption that i t  affected the country's 
investment climate during the study period. 
ETHIOPIAN PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME-AN OVERVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS 
The Ethiopian Privatisation Agency (EPA) was established in 
February 1994 by proclamation No. 87t1994, made in accordance 
to Article 9 (d) of the Transitional Period Charter. Since then EPA 
is the lead agency in carrying out the procesa of privatisation of 
SOEs. A board of management, consisting of five permanent 
members, who are designated by the government and a general 
manager, administers the agency. The agency is directly 
accountable to the prime minister office in all matters. In addition 
to this, the chairman of the board of the enterprises under 
privatisation .and one of the representatives, of workers in that 
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board participate as non-voting members (Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia [TGE], 1994). 
According to the latest proclamation No. 146198, issued in 
December 1998, EPA is committed to attaining objectives such as: 
generating revenue required for financing development activities 
undertaken by the government; changing the role and participation 
of the government in the economy to enable it to exert more effort 
on activities requiring its attention; and promoting the country's 
economic development through encouraging the expansion of 
private sector (Government of Ethiopia [GoE], 1998). In addition 
to the powers and duties vested under proclamation No. 146198, 
EPA is also conferred, under proclamation No. 11011995 and its 
amendment proclamation No. 19312000, with the power to 
investigate and decide on claims of ownership in respect of 
properties confiscated in extra-legal manner through directives as 
well as through written or oral orders. 
Measuring the Ethiopian Privatisation 
Measuring privatisation is the most crucial task before assessing its 
impact on any variable be i t  economic or social. No doubt, the 
privatisation proceeds help in this regard to judge as to how mush 
the scale of privatisation is in a given country. But, it would not 
reveal the real magnitude of privatisation unless it is related to the 
output of the country. Keeping this in mind, the magnitude of 
privatisation is the sum of privatisation proceeds collected during 
the year, as a share of GDP which is used to measure the size of 
the privatisation. This measurement is used as privatisation 
variable through out this study which is almost same as the 
privatisation variable used by Cook and Uchida (2003) and Plane 
(1997). 
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Table 1: Magnitude of Privatisation Transactions, 1994195 to 2003104 
Year No. of Privatisation GDP PPIGDP 
Privatisations Proceeds (USD Millions) (In Percentage) 
(PP) 
(USD 
Millions) 
1994195 14 29.54 5,779 0.5 1 
Annual 
Average 22 6,277 0.2 1 
Total 433.7 
Source: EPA (2004) and World Bank (2004) 
Table 1 reveals that the privatisation was started with 14 
maiden transactions which contributed on an average USD 43.37 
million a year, and the volume rose up to USD 51.46 million in the 
following fiscal year 1995196. Privatisation proceeds collected 
during the first phase, 1994195 to 1998199 were more lucrative 
than the second phase, 1999100 to 2003104. Of the total proceeds, 
88.07 per cent were collected during the first phase which was a 
good sign of progress, whereas, in the second phase, it was only 
11.93 per cent which shows a poor performance. It is also observed 
that the earlier phase was considered a boost, owing to the 
proceeds received during the fiscal year 1997198 which was the 
peak moment in the Ethiopian privatisation history that yielded 
USD 193.1 million, constituting 45 per cent in the total proceeds 
collected during the privatisation period. Since then, there has not 
been any commendable progress in the privatisation revenues. In 
total, the programme yielded USD 433.7 millions. Nellis (2003) 
finds that the size of privatisation in the country over the period 
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constitutes only 4.7 per cent of the total sale proceeds received in 
the whole African region. 
C 
Figure 1: Privatisation Proceeds, 1994195 to 2003104 
Privatisation Proceeds, 1994195 to 
2003104 
i --t Privatisation Proceeds(USD Million) 
I I I -a- Annual Share of Privatisation Proceeds in the Total Proceeds - Linear (Privatisation Proceeds(USD Million)) I 
-Linear (Annual Share of Privatisation Proceeds in the Total Proceeds) 
Source: Finance and Administration Department, EPA (2004) 
Figure 1 shows an outright fall of privatisation revenues 
after the fiscal year, 1997198, shrinking the net magnitude of the 
privatisation. Further, there was a high degree of uncertainties on 
privatisation proceeds-measured by the standard deviation (o = 
2.17) of the flow of privatisation proceeds as a share of GDP- 
fluctuating highly during the study period. It is distressing to note 
from the findings that PPIGDP has not reached a three per cent 
figure over the period. The only impressive year was that of 
1997/98, bagging a two per cent PPIGDP ratio, owing to the sale of 
a mining enterprise- the most expensive sale ever in the 
Ethiopian privatisation history. 
The analysis after the fiscal year 1997/98 shows a declining 
trend of 1.26 and 0.61 per cents of PPIGDP for 1998199 ard 
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1999100 fiscal years respectively. The size reached the lowest 
record level even after these fiscal years with an average of 4.25 
transactions per year. During the fiscal years 2001102, 2002/03 
and 2003104 only one transaction per year was recorded. As a 
result, the average PPIGDP ratio during the study period became 
too little, accounting for 0.21 per cent which fell to the lowest 
amongst those poorly performing countries. 
Privatisation and its Effect on Macroeconomic Variables 
The magnitude of privatisation, which includes the total flow of 
proceeds, expressed as a share of GDP, has made a direct impact 
on various variables of economic growth and capital accumulation. 
To prove this, we examine the relationships between privatisation 
variable and budgetary deficit in per cent of GDP, and openness, 
the correlation details with the selected variables for this study is 
given in annexure 3A. The inclusion of these two variables was 
justified by taking into account their uniqueness in nature. 
Budgetary deficit, which is expected to have a decreasing effect as 
a result of privatisation, has been ignored in many studies. Further, 
its effect on capital accumulation is enormous as i t  is considered an 
important factor for crowding out that increases the public sector 
deficit, resulting in the reduction of private sector investment. 
The openness4-otherwise conceived as the worth of 
international trade to a nation-is defined as the average of imports 
and exports, expressed as a share of GDP which is always expected 
as a result of privatisation to have a positive and significant effect. 
Week (2001) posits that the share of imports and exports is 
assumed to be functions of the real exchange rate. It is further 
noted from his heterodox model that the import share increases 
with the rate of growth, and holding the exchange rate constant, 
export will rise with an improvement in the terms of trade boosting 
further investment. 
4 Openness used in this study refers to the average of exports and imports 
expressed as share of GDP. The same measurement can be found in many 
studies including Baumol and Alan (1997). 
Figure 2: The Correlation between Privatisation and Government Budget 
Deficit 
Source: World Bank (2004). African Development Indicators and E P A  
(2004), Privatisation Proceeds from1994195 to 2002/03 
The result shown in Figure 2 indicates that there is no 
correlation between the privatisation variable and the budgetary 
deficit. A test of coefficient of correlation shows that there is a 
weak correlation between these two variables (r = -.224). It can 
also be explained that there is a little five per cent variation (r2 = 
0.05) in the budgetary deficit by the variation in the privatisation 
variable. Hence, it may be said that the privatisation in the country 
has no impact on the budgetary deficit which is one of the high 
fiscal determinants deciding the private capital accumulation, 
particularly private capital. 
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Figure 3: The Correlation between Privatisation and Openness 
The same test is applied on the openness of the country, the 
result as shown in Figure 3,'is the same as the budgetary deficit, 
proving that there is no correlation between the privatisation 
variable and openness(r = -0.099). The openness variable could 
explain much less than one per cent (r2 =0.0098) of the variation in 
the privatisation variable. Nonetheless, openness may not be a 
major determinant of privatisation. Indeed, some of the developed 
countries including the USA whose economies are relatively open 
(Baumol and Alan, 1997:28), their privatisation is dominated by 
indigenes unlike the case of Ethiopia. 
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The foregoing discussions and analyses show that 
privatisation made little improvement on the macroeconomic 
environment, thus a limited impact on capital accumulation. The 
variables taken for the simple analysis proved insignificant 
correlations, owing to the slow and small privatisation, coupled 
with poor processing. These findings raise a doubt about the 
conduciveness of the privatisation paradigm towards capital 
accumulation, and even as to whether i t  acquired the minimum 
advantages of privatisation which have been gained in the rest of 
the developing world. 
ETHIOPIAN PRIVATISATION MODEL AND ITS 
RELATIVITY TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
Creating and improving the investment climate is a top priority in a 
modern world, particularly for the developing African countries 
because investment is considered an engine for economic growth 
and poverty reduction in the long run. The task of attracting a 
sizable investment in this regard for many African countries is 
indispensable, and should be pursued multifaceted given that 
investment leads not only to a simple growth, but also it creates 
sustainable jobs and opportunities for citizens and entrepreneurs. 
Ethiopia, which was one of the previously fiscally 
unattractive for investment in the Sub-Saharan, is now an 
investment driven and friendly country, where i t  is believed that 
investment helps to reduce the cost of goods consumed by the poor 
people, and improves their living conditions directly. It, moreover, 
contributes to an expanding tax base by indirectly enhancing the 
government's interest in improving health, education and welfare 
of the people. Ethiopia, ranking one of the highest in poverty 
(World Bank, 2004) and the lowest in the human resource 
development index (UNDP, 2003), had realised a decade ago the 
paramount importance of investment after the installation of the 
new government in 1991. Commencing with the Investment Code 
Reform No. 1511992, the government established the Ethiopian 
Investment Authority (EIA), followed by the establishment of the 
Ethiopian Privatisation Agency (EPA) in 1994. Further, the 
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Investment Code Amendments in 1996 and 1998 and their 
reenactments with the broader objectives in 2002 are worth 
mentioning to enrich the Ethiopian investment drive, calling the 
potential domestic and foreign investors to exploit and develop the 
immense natural resources (GoE, 2002). 
Investment climate after a series of proclamations and 
reforms provides incentives for development related investment, 
reduces capital entry requirements for joint ventures and technical 
consultancy services, permits duty free entry of capital goods 
(except computers and vehicles), opens the real estate sector to 
expatriate investors, extends the losses carried forward provisions, 
cuts the capital gains tax from 40 to 10 per cent, full repatriation 
for foreign investors and gives priority to investors in obtaining 
land for lease. However, the foreign participation in the most 
profitable energy and financial services was, however, restricted 
posing obstacles to privatisation and investment climate of the 
country. 
Since 1991, any investment that supplements the attempts 
of creating an openness economy has been well privileged on the 
payment of duties and other taxes (GoE, 1992). The guarantee is 
extended to investors that no asset will be expropriated or 
nationalised except in accordance with the regulations of the 
government, and upon the payment of adequate compensation. To 
change the negative opinion about the judiciary system, 
particularly among foreigners, the country signed the World Bank 
Treaty "International Convention on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States". 
Table 2 shows the performance of private capital 
accumulation in the total capital accumulation-public and private, 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) during the privatisation period. 
It indicates that there was a considerable share of private 
investment in the total GDI, when compared to the public 
investment. Although the difference of annual average rate 
between the public and private investment as a percentage of GDP 
was too narrow during the privatisation period, the difference 
between the private and public capital accumulation was only 1.08 
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percentage points (Table 2), the achievement of the private capital 
accumulation should not be underestimated. 
Table 2: Investment and its Share in GDP, 1994195 to 2003104 
Year Gross Public Gross Private GDI* or FDIIGDP 
InvestmentIGDP InvestmentIGDP GFCFJGDP (%I 
(%) (%) (%) 
1994195 7.5 8.9 16.4 0.14 
1995196 7.5 9.4 16.9 0.16 
1996197 8.3 8.7 17.0 0.89 
1997198 7.4 9.8 17.2 0.11 
1998199 8.1 8.8 16.9 1.92 
1999JOO 5.2 10.7 15.9 0.68 
200010 1 8.5 9.3 17.8 0.64 
200 1 102 11.5 9.0 20.5 0.00 
2002103 11.6 8.9 20.5 0.22 
2003104 Na** na 22.6 0.02 
Annual 8.18 9.26 18.06 0.27 
Average 
Note: *Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) and Gross Fixed Capital 
. , 
Forrnation(GFCF) can be interchangeably used,** Not available 
Source: World Bank (2004) and MoFED (2004) 
Attempts to account for such a meagre difference reveals 
that the reason may be nothing but the transition of the country 
from socialism to capitalism, a period government finds difficult 
to withdraw its stake from public enterprises. And also, the 
withdrawal of state intervention from the economy has carefully 
been carried out in the country contrary to those of Latin American 
and Eastern European blocks where the withdrawal was fast and 
vast. 
It is also found that FDI as a share of GDP accounts only for 
0.27 per cent during the period. It is due to the fact that foreign 
investors are pragmatically more sensitive than the domestic 
investors to the prevalence of the economic and political 
conditions which they always see and analyse in a microscopic 
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view because the only reason they invest is to enhance their 
welfare, whatever they perceive it to be (Ambrosio, 1976: 15). 
Nonetheless, the meagre flow may have its own share in increasing 
GDI based on the fact that there is a direct positive linear 
relationship between FDI, domestic investment and the growth of 
GDP (Thinvall, 2004: 592-93). 
Table 3: Investment Performance before and after Privatisation (Average 
Annual Growth) 
Investment Flows . Pre-privatisation Post-privatisation 
(as a share of ~erformance ~eiformance 
GDP) 1986187 to 1993194 1994195 to 2003104 
GFCF 10.37 18.18 
Public Investment 5.57 8.18 
Private Investment 3.60 9.26 
FDI 0.12 0.27 
Source: MOPED (2003), MoFED (2003), MoFED (2004) & World Bank (2004) 
Table 3 provides a summary of the capital accumulation 
between two different periods, pre-privatisation and post- 
privatisation. The result shows a change in the capital 
accumulation with a varying degree. Capital accumulation after 
privatisation is significant since the annual growth rate.of GDI and 
private investment increased by 75.31 and 157 per cents 
respectively. The growth rate of public investment which was 
lower than that of private investment and, not parallel during the 
post-privatisation, indicating a declining interest of the state 
towards dominance. It is also found that FDI as a share of GDP 
increased but insignificantly from 0.12 per cent to 0.27 per cent. 
The country's performance on private capital accumulation, 
compared to other Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries was far 
from being satisfactory as the latter were able to achieve an annual 
average of 13.5 per cent (World Bank, 2004) during the study 
period. It is important to note that GDI in SSA has been lower than 
. 
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in other developing regions (Griffin, 2001: 21). In a nutshell, the 
Ethiopian's performance in attracting private investment directly 
or through privatisation initiatives was not robust compared to its 
Sub-Saharan neighbours, and was marginal relative to other 
developing countries in the world (International Finance 
Corporation (1FC)IWorld Bank, 2002) despite the country's 
investment friendly climate-creating efforts. 
When analysing the causes for failure in attracting a 
significant amount of investment for capital accumulation, i t  may 
be due to the slow and small sized privatisation, coupled with poor 
processing, economic and political instability, weak openness, poor 
savings and unattractive commercial framework. Slow 
privatisation always resists investment, causing damage to many 
African countries with significant FDI potential (Eden, 1996). A 
weak capacity and poor entrepreneurial attitude of the locals, 
coupled with the processing constraints, may also be some of the 
reasons for the poorer show of privatisation and capital 
accumulation. Other significant variables to attract investment are 
the rate of growth and openness. Economic growth and openness 
are positively associated which in turn correlate with investment 
(Alesina, 1998). But the growth was found to be low and unstable 
in the country with a lot of ups and downs and uncertainties amidst 
a significant increase of the output during the privatisation period 
and openness also experience a similar effect. (see annex: Table 
4B). Openness was found to be !ow with annual average of 20.91 
per cent, showing the country's inward orientation and economic 
isolation. Selvam (2005) also states that the country's openness 
falls below the minimum requirements, as 30 per cent is requir5d 
to call a country moderately open in an increasingly globalised 
environment. Brautigam (1998) proves that if there is difficulty in 
maintaining macroeconomic stability, i t  will lead to a sharp decline 
in  investment. The inflows of investment are thus a consequence of 
successful development, not a cause of it. 
No doubt, the capacity to purchase and invest primarily 
correlates with savings pattern, but it was not a soothing effect in 
the latter part of the study period. Gross domestic savings as a 
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share of GDP over the first phase of privatisation accounted for 
7.64 per cent which declined to 4.74 per cent over the study period 
(World Bank, 2004). Inflation during the period was moderate, 
recording 3.61 per cent. However, i t  fluctuated highly and had 
risen to even 15 and 9 per cents in  2002103 and 2003104 
respectively which might have caused a low profile for those 
potential investors to make long-term investment decision. On the 
other hand, such condition of inflation may develop a pattern of 
investment biased in favour of projects with a quick pay off 
(Griffin, 2001: 17). Nonetheless, a mild inflation, up to 5.8 per 
cent, is positively beneficial for growth (Thirwall 2004)' 
particularly in  developing countries. Real interest rate is one of the 
policy variables affecting private capital directly. Annual average 
of real interest rate, which was 9.5 per cent over the period 
(MoFED, 2004), was considered a moderate rate for the borrowers. 
The war with Eritrea in 1998 has, however, caused a lot of 
damage to the Ethiopian investment climate, impinging investors' 
attitudes towards investing. The war, though now diluted, coupled 
with a sort of uncertainty in the economic and regulatory policies 
have been persisting as strong obstacles that still work against the 
privatisation and investment of the country. The country with a 
poorer market potentiality and high risks associated with the 
security of property rights and poor consumer preferences, should 
over-perform to convince investors in order to receive a steady 
flow of investment. The need of such task is very urgent due to the 
following reasons: land issue is the most haunting one in the 
country since the investors can buy only the factory infrastructure 
and business, but not the land. 
Many existing as well as the potential investors are not at 
ease on land issue which is found to have adversely affected their 
further investment on modernisation and expansion. One of the 
investors during a focal group discussion uttered that "much to my 
disgust is the land of the enterprise; my balance sheet looks so 
deserted without aizy value of land". There have been many cases 
of Ethiopian investors losing the value of their investmect, owing 
to the wrong allotment of land due for the farmers or the Rental 
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Commission of Ethiopia. Further, many investors see the country 
as a poorly judiciary nation, where several cases of expropriation 
remain unsettled or never to be settled. Although concrete efforts 
are taken, the judiciary system still operates in a rudimentary stage 
and many judges lack the commercial knowledge. Fear among the 
foreign investors still exists despite the treaty signed by the 
country, the International Convention on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) between States and Nationals of other States. 
Above all, micro problems such as administration of tax 
rates, electricity, customs and trade regulations, corruption, anti- 
competitive or informal practices and commercial and regulatory 
uncertainties have been found as major hindrances in attracting 
investment inflows. Tax rates and its administration are the most 
dislikeable to the potential investors (Investment climate Survey, 
World Bank, 2002). The survey, which was conducted in the 
country, found that the commercial conduciveness and 
infrastructure and service facilities existing in the country were 
rated poor by the investors and firms. Corruption and diseases 
prevail, found virtually everywhere, particularly in all developing 
countries-but economic isolation (Sach, 2005) is the special 
phenomenon in the African continent. Ethiopia is no exception to 
this isolation. 
Empirical Testing and Interpretations 
The results of impact of privatisation on the private capital 
accumulation, tested at five per cent significance level, are given in 
Table 4. The model's explanatory power is substantially robust and : 
behaved soundly with the adjusted R~ value of 0.956. The 
empirical findings in the model underscores the fact that 
privatisation is robustly negative on the private capital 
accumulation of the country. The result is not surprising as the 
privatisation programme in the country suffered a serious setback 
owing to the weak institutional framework, poor processing, small 
size and slow pace. Moreover, the economic reforms in general, 
which are supposed to supplement or facilitate the privatisation, 
were not up to the task. Such flaws, as seen in the previous 
Privatisation and Capital Accumulation: Empirical Evidence 81 
discussion, are found to .be lavished on tax rates and its 
administration, property rights and commercial framework in the 
country. 
Table 4: OLS Results of Impact of Privatisation on Capital Accumulation 
Variables Co-eflcient T-statistic Significance 
Constant 
ICDPIt-I 
[Inflation]t 0.313 1:561 0.259 
[Real Interest Rate],., 0.3 93 2.264 0.152 
[War with Eritrea], -1.045 -5.2 74 0.034 
Adjusted R* 0.956 
F-statistic 2 7.733 
Significance (F- 0.033 
Statistic) 
Standard Error of the 0.046 
Estimate 
DM, 3.084 
Note: All variables in logarithmic form 
Dependent Variable: Private Investment 
A negative and statistically significant result is obtained for 
GDP which is contrary to the outcomes of many developing 
countries where it carried a positive impact on the capital 
accumulation (Weeks, 2001). This result may be justified from the 
point that the country failed to stabilise the economic growth 
despite its moderate achievement on the growth rate over the 
privatisation period. Theories of economic growth give its own 
practical literature that economic growth is not simply an increase 
of productivity over a period, but it is concerned with the long run 
trend rise in output rather than its fluctuation (Pentecost, 2002). So, 
. 
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it can be said that a country cannot take advantage of investment if 
there has been instability despite growth. 
The result, moreover, indicates that savings is fragile in the 
regression. The result can be substantiated from the fact that the 
country recorded the lowest savings (3.53 per cent as a percentage 
of GDP over the study period) compared to other SSA countries. In 
the same line, inflation is also insignificant which could be 
attributed to the reason that many private investors are assumed to 
have invested on those short run and non-producti ve investments. 
Thus, the effect of inflation is considered insignificant and 
secondary. The significant and positive result on the real interest 
rate indicates that the moderate rate that prevailed over the study 
period had the possibility of encouraging the investors despite the 
weak credit demand of the investors (World Bank, 2003). The 
estimation of coefficient on war is, as expected, robustly negative 
to reveal that the war with Eritrea affected badly the investment 
climate of the country. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis has shown that privatisation has contributed 
negatively to the private capital accumulation of the country, 
suggesting the country needs to review and revitalise its 
privatisation programme, coupled with the investors-friendly 
economic reforms. Privatisation should be viewed, not as an end 
itself, but as part of a broader programme of reforms. If the reform 
measures fail, privatisation cannot stand alone to succeed. 
Revealing the negative effect of GDP on private capital, 
empirical model used by this study suggests that the country needs 
to maintain macroeconomic balances pragmatically rather than 
ideologically. It is, therefore, assumed that had the country enjoyed 
a comfortable macroeconomic stability and a high degree of 
openness, it would have accumulated a significant private capital 
from the domestic and foreign investors. The fragile results on 
savings and inflation also suggest that the country should 
essentially pursue macroeconomic stability despite the fact that the 
real interest rate is a soothing effect. The political instability, the 
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common and chronic issue in Africa, may also provide a strong 
explanation for the country's poor performance on privatisation 
and investment. War with Eritrea has been proved to be a severe 
blow to the investment climate of the country. It can finally be said 
that a strong and bureaucratically free economic foundations along 
with a peaceful international relations should be a first hand 
priority. 
Many researches into the investment reveal that cost- 
structures, differential returns, market growth and the institutional 
characteristics of the country are the most important determinants, 
but they are yet to come to be lucrative in the country. Investors 
wishing to invest always look for a favourable trade and 
investment regimes, good infrastructure, property rights, economic 
and political stability and an educated and committed workforce. 
Above all, the major investment incentives, particularly tax 
concessions need to be reformed to the extent that it should create 
business friendly conditions. It should also be noted that among all 
types of investment flows, FDI is considered an important input for 
the enormous gross domestic investment in which the country 
greatly failed. Foreign investors need to be encouraged and 
handled diligently as FDI can often be a catalyst for domestic 
investment and it may play a significant role in generating positive 
spill over effects, bringing new technologies and management and 
marketing skills and contributing to economic growth in 
developing countries. This study may lack a thorough analysis 
about the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policies such as money 
supply and exchange rate. Hence, a further study on these 
implications affecting privatisation and private capital 
accumulation is needed for the better understanding of the accurate 
connectivity between these two variables. 
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Appendix 
Statistical Annexure 
lble 3A: Correlation between the Selected Variables for the Study 
GDP lnflatio 
PRllNVEST Growth Savings R Interest n hivatisation 
Z.!INVES Pearson 1 -.447 -.089 ,445 -.056 -.836(**) Correlation 
Sig. (2- 
.228 .820 .269 ,887 .005 tailed) 
N 9 9 9 8 9 9 
3 P  Pearson 
-.447 I ,023 -.I 10 -.474 ,244 Correlation 
Sip. (2- 
.228 .954 ,795 ,197 .528 tailed) 
N 9 9 9 8 9 9 
::\ ings Pearson 
-.089 ,023 I -.317 -.I64 ,399 Correlation 
Sig. (2- 
,820 ,954 .444 ,673 ,287 tailed) 
N 9 9 9 8 9 9 
7 Interest Pearson 
.445 -.I 10 -.317 1 -.733(*) -.459 Correlation 
Sig. (2- 
,269 .795 .444 ,039 ,252 tailed) 
r 3ation Pearson 
-.056 -.474 -. 164 -.733(*) I . I  17 Correlation 
Sig. (2 -  
.887 .I97 .673 ,039 ,764 
tailed) 
%vatisation Pearson 
-.836(**) ,244 ,399 -.459 ,117 I Correlation 
Sig. (2- 
.005 .528 .287 .252 ,764 tailed) 
N 9 9 9 8 9 10 
" Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
rorrelation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4A: Descriptive SCatistics of Variables on the Parameten Selected for 
the Study 
Maximu Std. 
N Minimum m Mean Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
PRllNVES 9 1.76 2.45 2.1 1 1 0.073 0.218 0.W 
GDP Growth 9 0 2.36 1.39 0.292 0.875 0.7M 
Savings 9 0.1 1 2.08 - 1.29 0.250 0.75 1 0.5@ 
R lnerest 8 0.29 3.07 2.27 0.3 12 0.88 1 0.77; 
Inflation 9 -1.2 2.7 1 1.01 . 0.459 1.38 1.8( 
Privatisation 10 . -4.83 1.07 -1.802 0.685 ' 2.17 4.65 
Valid N 
